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Abstract
The determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) have 
been extensively studied. Even though there is extensive 
research in the area, most of it is based on analyzing the 
effects of host country characteristics on FDI flows, and 
yet there is little research on how neighboring country 
characteristics play a role in facilitating FDI flows to host 
countries. This paper analyzes the association between the 
democracy level in neighboring countries and FDI flows to 
host countries. Using bilateral FDI flows from the OECD 
countries, with a large host country sample, we find that 
countries surrounded by democratic countries attract higher 
FDI flows. Furthermore, we find evidence that countries 
that are surrounded by neighboring countries with good in-
stitutions tend themselves to have better institutions, experi-
ence lower civil conflict, and have higher political stability 
and hence indirectly attract higher FDI flows. Our findings 
suggest that if neighboring countries act in such way as 
to become more democratic, FDI flows to these countries 
would be higher since not only does improving the quality 
of democracy attract more FDI inflows, but also being sur-
rounded by neighboring advanced democratic countries will 
also lead to higher FDI flows to them.
K E Y W O R D S
democracy, democracy in the neighborhood, foreign direct 
investment, institutions, neighborhood characteristics
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1 |  INTRODUCTION
The determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) have been extensively studied in the literature 
(see, for example, Blonigen & Piger, 2014, for an extensive list of determinants). Even though there is 
extensive research on the determinants of FDI flows, most of this research is based on the source, and 
the effect of host countries’ characteristics on FDI flows, and there is little research on how neighbor-
ing country characteristics play a role in FDI flows to host countries.
The linkages between neighboring country characteristics, however, have been examined in the 
literature. For instance, Easterly and Levine (2000) find that growth levels of countries are positively 
associated with the growth levels in their neighboring countries, and policies in neighboring coun-
tries are contagious (see also Kelejian, Murrell, & Shepotylo, 2013, where governance in neighbor-
ing countries is positively associated with countries’ own governance levels). Similarly, Bosker and 
Garretsen (2009) find that the institutional quality of countries and of their neighbors has a direct 
effect on their long-term economic development. Recently, Qureshi (2013) finds that conflicts in 
neighboring countries reduce bilateral trade. To our knowledge, recent literature has only consid-
ered the relevance of host country characteristics in attracting FDI flows. For instance, in a seminal 
paper, Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozkan, and Volosovych (2008) find that the institutional quality of the host 
country explains the Lucas paradox (Lucas, 1990) suggesting that the reason why rich countries do 
not invest in poor countries is due to poor institutions in the latter (see also Pinar & Volkan, 2018). 
Similarly, Jensen (2003) finds that democratic countries attract relatively higher FDI flows compared 
to authoritarian regimes—see also Jakobsen and de Soysa (2006) and Asiedu and Lien (2011), where 
democratization in most countries leads to higher FDI flows. One potential reason for this is that the 
democratization process contributes to greater FDI openness, leading to higher FDI flows (see, for 
example, Pandya, 2014). In a recent paper, Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2014) show that 
the reduction in political risk, which is captured by various institutional quality proxies of the host 
country, leads to a significant increase in FDI levels (see also Economou, Hassapis, Philippas, & 
Tsionas, 2017 where institutional factors are determinants of FDI both for the OECD and developing 
countries).1 Even though the political, democratic, and institutional setting in the host country is ex-
tensively investigated, the effect of democratization of neighboring countries on FDI flows to the host 
country has not yet been examined in the literature, and this paper intends to fill this gap.
There are many channels that can affect FDI in a country through different characteristics of its 
neighboring countries (see Section 2 for a detailed discussion on some of these channels). An obvious 
one is for FDI to depend on the present and expected future performance of a given country, which in 
turn depends on the level of competition between the respective country and its neighboring countries. 
As discussed above, countries that have better institutional settings receive relatively higher capital 
flows, and neighboring countries would compete to improve their institutional quality setting to attract 
higher capital flows. In that respect, it is not surprising to expect that neighbors’ institutional setting 
matters for FDI where the diffusion of information and institutional framework is stronger (see, for 
example, Easterly & Levine, 2000; Kelejian et al., 2013; Ward & Dorussen, 2015). In this paper we 
argue that neighboring countries that compete to attain a better institutional environment to attract 
FDI create positive spillover effects on each other, suggesting that institutional agglomerations tend 
to attract more investment.
J E L  C L A S S I F I C A T I O N
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We use gravity models and dynamic panel data estimation techniques and find that countries sur-
rounded by good democracies attract higher FDI flows. For robustness, we control for different neigh-
boring country characteristics such as the rule of law, political stability, civil conflict, and the market 
size, and our results remain robust. Furthermore, the results are also robust to the use of different 
samples and estimation techniques.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss briefly how neighboring country char-
acteristics play a role in countries’ economic, social and political outcomes and discuss how these 
factors might also play a role in attracting FDI flows to host countries. Section 3 discusses the data 
and variables used in this paper, and also provides details on how neighboring country characteristics 
are obtained. Section 4 presents the estimation technique, and Section 5 offers the results. Section 6 
concludes.
2 |  NEIGHBORING COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS AND 
THEIR EFFECT ON OTHER COUNTRIES
In this section we discuss the effects of neighboring country characteristics on other countries and 
discuss how these factors might play direct and/or indirect roles in attracting higher FDI flows to host 
countries.
It is a long-established finding that countries with higher market access (MA) and/or market po-
tential (MP), which is measured by the closeness of a country to other high-income countries, tend to 
have a higher income (see, for example, Crafts & Venables, 2003; Redding & Venables, 2004; Liu & 
Meissner, 2015), with access to the export market found to be one of the main factors behind this rela-
tionship (see Bosker & Garretsen, 2012; de Sousa, Mayer, & Zignago, 2012). Even though the above 
papers examined the relationship between MA and economic development of a country, recent studies 
also examined the link between FDI and MA. For instance, Blanco (2012) finds that the surrounding 
market potential has a significant positive effect on net FDI flows to Latin American countries. At a 
regional level, multinational firms in the German border region show a significant preference to invest 
in the neighboring Czech regions (Schäffler, Hecht, & Moritz, 2017). Similar spillover effects on 
neighboring regions have been found in Polish counties, with those counties identified as special eco-
nomic zones having a strong positive employment impact in the host county as well as in neighboring 
counties (Cizkowicz, Cizkowicz-Pekala, Pekala, & Rzonca, 2017).
Another effect across neighboring countries is the spillover of social, economic, and political pol-
icies and outcomes. In particular, policies are found to be contagious when countries surrounded by 
other countries with better institutions also have a better institutional setting. For example, Kelejian 
et al. (2013) find that governance in neighboring countries is positively related to the countries’ own 
governance levels. Similarly, Ward and Dorussen (2015) find that public knowledge of the impor-
tance of governance leads to higher diffusion of good governance to neighboring countries. One of 
the practical implications of this is the establishment and enlargement of the European Union. In 
order to join the EU, countries need to follow the Copenhagen criteria that require ‘stable conditions 
guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law’, something that led to the diffusion of democracy and in-
stitutional quality within Europe. Furthermore, institutional quality in neighboring countries is found 
to be important in affecting economic growth and development. For instance, Easterly and Levine 
(2000) show that the economic performance of a country is good if its neighbors have relatively higher 
economic growth. On the other hand, Bosker and Garretsen (2009) find that not only does countries’ 
own institutional quality matter for long-term economic development but also the institutional quality 
of neighboring countries directly explains development levels. In other words, being surrounded by 
4 |   PINAR ANd STENGOS
countries with better institutional quality not only leads to better governance but also increases gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita. In this paper we examine whether these indirect linkages between 
neighboring and host country affect FDI flows.
The other channel that is found to be important in affecting a country’s income level is political 
unrest or instability in neighboring countries. For instance, Ades and Chua (1997) find that political 
instability in a neighboring country may lead to lower economic performance by decreasing the mag-
nitude of trade and expenditure on education and increasing the expenditure on the military. Qureshi 
(2013) finds that conflict in neighboring countries reduces bilateral trade. Furthermore, conflict in 
neighboring countries may lead to inflows of refugees (Moore & Shellman, 2007), resulting in an in-
creased probability of violence and civil war (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006; Blattman & Miguel, 2010), 
as well as an adverse effect on health and education of refugee-hosting economies (Baez, 2011). 
Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, and Younas (2014) find that both domestic and transnational terrorism in 
the host country have a negative effect on FDI (see also Gaibulloev & Younas, 2016, who show that 
higher conflict levels lead to lower levels of domestic bank lending). In a more recent paper, Filer and 
Stanišić (2016) show that terror incidents not only lower FDI flows to host countries but also lead to 
lower investment to neighboring countries. However, Hegre (2014) finds that the democracies have 
less conflict than semi-democracies, suggesting that the establishment of long-lasting democracies 
has some mitigating effect on conflict.
Based on the previous literature, we expect that democratic institutions in neighboring countries 
are key in affecting the allocation of FDI. If a country is surrounded by countries that have strong 
democratic institutions, these neighboring countries are less likely to experience conflict (see, for 
example, Hegre, 2014), which would then decrease the likelihood of the host country experiencing 
conflict (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006; Blattman & Miguel, 2010). Furthermore, if a host country is 
surrounded by countries that have good institutions, this would also improve the economic outcomes 
of the host country (Bosker & Garretsen, 2009), and would lead to improvements in its institutional 
quality (Kelejian et al., 2013; Ward & Dorussen, 2015). Overall, being surrounded by countries that 
have well-developed institutions would increase the likelihood of countries improving their economic 
and institutional outcomes and decrease the likelihood of them experiencing conflict. Therefore, if a 
host country is surrounded by countries that have better institutions, this would make the host country 
a relatively safer and socioeconomically more desirable place in which to invest compared to other 
host countries that are surrounded by countries that have worse institutions. As a result, we expect that 
host countries surrounded by countries that have good institutions are likely to attract more FDI flows. 
In Section 5 we will examine whether this theoretical expectation holds empirically. This proposition 
has been analyzed by the contagion effect concerning financial flows (see, for example, Kaminsky & 
Reinhart, 2000; Corsetti, Pericoli, & Sbracia, 2005; Forbes & Warnock, 2012; Dell'Erba & Reinhardt, 
2015); however, whether neighboring characteristics directly affect FDI flows has not yet been exam-
ined, something that we intend to do in this paper.
Given the above discussion on potential direct and indirect links between neighboring country 
characteristics and FDI to a host country, we will examine whether these characteristics play a direct 
or indirect role in FDI flows to host countries. In particular, we will examine two channels by which 
the quality of institutions in the neighboring countries can affect FDI flows to a country. Firstly, we 
will examine whether investing countries consider regional institutional quality to play a direct role 
in attracting FDI. Secondly, we will analyze the indirect relationship of institutional quality in neigh-
boring countries and other factors in the host country, such as the effects of neighboring institutional 
quality on other factors in the host country.
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3 |  DATA AND VARIABLES
Our paper uses panel data of FDI flows from 34 OECD countries to 143 host countries between 1993 
and 2012 as the dependent variable (see the list of the countries used in Table A1 in Appendix A).
The OECD provides FDI flows from OECD countries to host countries between 1985 and 2013; 
however, most of the FDI flow data before the 1993 period and for 2013 had many missing values and 
therefore are excluded from the analysis.2 The reason for the exclusion of the period before 1993 was 
our attempt to include as many OECD countries as possible in our analysis since some of the OECD 
countries became independent after 1991, and they did not have data for FDI flows.3 Still, our data set 
covers a period of analysis that is longer than those used by the recent studies—for example, Mishra 
and Jena (2019) used the period 2001–12, Belgibayeva and Plekhanov (2019) used bilateral FDI flows 
for the period 2008–12, Xu (2019) considered the period 2001–12, and Donaubauer, Neumayer, and 
Nunnenkamp (2020) cover the period 2001–12.
3.1 | Institutional quality
There are many measures of institutional quality, but one of the most commonly used in the literature 
is the democracy index from the Polity IV project (i.e. Polity 2). This index captures three elements 
that are directly related to the protection of property rights and other aspects that are important to at-
tract FDI. These three essential elements are described as follows:
One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express 
effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of 
institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. The third is the 
guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and acts of political partici-
pation. (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2016, p. 14).
Knutsen (2011) finds that the relatively democratic countries have higher protection of property rights. 
Hence, we use a democracy proxy as our primary institutional quality measure, which consists of yearly 
data between 1993 and 2012 for 167 countries. We do not use small countries with little or no flows of 
FDI, and we ended up having data for 143 host countries.
We also use some other institutional quality proxies that are commonly used in the literature as 
controls in our robustness analysis, such as the rule of law measure from the World Governance 
Indicators constructed by the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2013). The effects of the 
rule of law on economic growth have been extensively examined through the mitigation of violence, 
the protection of property rights, institutional checks on government and control of private capture and 
corruption (see Haggard & Tiede, 2011, for theoretical and empirical analysis of the effect of the rule 
of law on aspects mentioned above).
3.2 | Neighboring country characteristics
For a host country i, we proceed to calculate the institutional quality of its neighboring countries by 
taking the average of the institutional quality values of the neighboring countries. For a given time t, 
we obtain the neighboring country institutional quality proxy as
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where N_INS푖푡 is the average institutional quality of neighboring countries of country i at time t, and 
INSt is an n×1 vector of observations on institutional quality levels for n countries. Finally, W is a n×n 
weighting matrix defined as
where m is the total number of neighbors of country i.4 Here, our main neighboring institutional quality 
measure is the democracy score; however, we have neighboring institutional quality proxies by using the 
rule of law, political stability, and absence-of-violence components from the World Governance Indicators 
as an additional set of control variables.
We also construct conflict and market size measures of neighboring countries similarly (see 
Section 2 for details of their importance). It is also possible that a given country might not be sur-
rounded by larger markets, but located to be close to high-income countries. Therefore, we also con-
struct a market potential (MP) measure at a given time t similarly to the Redding and Venables (2004) 
market potential measure as follows:
where MP푖푡 is the market potential of country i at time t and Dist푖푗 is the great circle distance between 
capital cities of countries i and j.
3.3 | Other control variables
In line with the literature on the determinants of FDI and gravity models, we also control for source 
and host country characteristics such as the market size of the source and host countries (i.e. GDP 
of source and host countries, respectively), population and land areas of source and host countries. 
Another important factor that has been considered in gravity models while examining bilateral 
trade and FDI flows is regional trade agreements (e.g. Baier & Bergstrand, 2007, Balgati, Egger, & 
Pfaffermayr, 2008; Ullah & Inaba, 2012; Thangavelu & Narjoko, 2014; Chenaf-Nicet and Rougier, 
2016; Martínez-San Román, Bengoa, & Sánchez-Robles, 2016; Cherif & Dreger, 2018), which we 
will also include in our estimations. Furthermore, we control for civil conflict and institutional quality 
of the host country. The definitions and sources of the variables used are presented in Table A2, and 
summary statistics are provided in Table A3.
4 |  METHODOLOGY
In general, it is hard to account for all the factors that might affect FDI flows since capital flows 
are potentially affected by hard-to-measure country-specific factors such as culture, trust, and social 
N_INS푖푡=WINSt
w푖푗 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
m
if i and j are neighbors
0 otherwise,
MP푖푡= ij≠
∑GDP푗푡
Dist푖푗
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capital. This could potentially lead to an omitted variable bias. Furthermore, a positive relationship 
between (countries’ own and neighboring countries’) institutions and FDI flows might be due to 
reverse causality. To account for the first concern (omitted variables and unobserved country hetero-
geneity), we use the gravity model with fixed effects. Although the gravity model is known for its ap-
plication in the trade flows—see, for example, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and see Head and 
Mayer (2014) for an overview of the use of gravity models in trade flows—gravity models have also 
been used to examine bilateral FDI flows (Head & Ries, 2008; Bergstrand & Egger, 2011; Petri, 2012; 
Bellos & Subasat, 2012; Thangavelu & Narjoko, 2014; Mishra & Jena, 2019; Xu, 2019; Belgibayeva 
& Plekhanov, 2019; Donaubauer et al., 2020). Therefore, our first estimation method is to use the fol-
lowing gravity model estimation specification:
where Fi,j,t is the FDI flows from country i (source) to j (host) at time period t. X includes the control vari-
ables that account for the size of the source and host economies, such as income, population, land area, 
and other host country characteristics such as conflict and institutional quality. Furthermore, we include 
the distance between the source and host country (Distancei,j) to account for information asymmetries and 
transaction costs. Languagei,j and Colonyi,j are dummy variables taking the value 1 if countries share a 
common language and have had a colonial link, respectively, and 0 otherwise. RTA푖푗푡 is a dummy variable 
taking the value 1 if countries i (source) and j (host) have a regional trade agreement at time period t 0 zero 
otherwise. Finally, we include NXj,t as the characteristics of the neighboring countries that might affect the 
FDI flows to host countries such as the quality of institutions, market potential of the host country, market 
size of the neighboring countries, and civil conflict.
Since the unobserved variables might be correlated with country-pair characteristics, we also con-
trol for country-pair fixed effects (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007). Finally, even though the gravity model 
accounts for time-invariant country effects and fixed time effects, the results obtained may be affected 
by endogeneity. The system generalized method of moments (GMM) has been one of the most popular 
methods to account for potential endogeneity while examining the determinants of FDI flows (see, for 
example, Asiedu & Lien, 2011; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Aziz, 2018; Saini & Singhania, 2018; 
Neanidis, 2019, for the use of GMM). As such, we apply the system GMM estimator suggested by 
Blundell and Bond (1998) where the lagged levels and first differences are used as instruments for the 
endogenous variables. In sum, this paper uses two popular methods in examining the determinant of 
the FDI flows to ensure the robustness of our findings.
5 |  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
5.1 | Gravity model estimates
We begin our analysis with the estimation of the gravity model. Table 1 presents the results when 
we control for year and source-country fixed effects (YSFE) and year and country-pair fixed effects 
(YCPFE) when we use democracy as a proxy for institutional quality. In columns 1–4 we control for 
the year and source-country fixed effects and use a different set of control variables. In column 1 we 
use the lagged FDI flows and democracy in the host and neighboring countries of the host country. 
We find that not only do democratic countries receive relatively higher FDI flows but also countries 
(1)
ln
(
Fi,j,t
)
=훽0+ ln
(
Fi,j,t−1
)
+X�
j,t−1
훽 j+X
�
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훽 i+훿1ln(퐷푖푠푡푎푛푐푒)푖푗+훿2(퐿푎푛푔푢푎푔푒)푖푗
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that are surrounded by relatively democratic countries also receive higher FDI flows where the coef-
ficients on host country democracy and democracy level of neighboring countries are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, the coefficient of lagged FDI inflows is 
positive, suggesting that the current FDI flows are positively correlated with the FDI inflows in the 
previous year. Column 2 of Table 1 gives the estimation results when we include the RTA dummy 
variable as an additional control variable, and in line with the previous literature, we find that host 
countries receive relatively higher FDI flows if they have regional trade agreements with source coun-
tries. In column 3 we include additional controls for host country characteristics, such as the market 
size (i.e. GDP), population, and area. In line with the empirical literature, we find that countries with 
larger market sizes receive relatively higher FDI flows, whereas countries with larger populations and 
areas receive relatively lower FDI flows. In column 4 we also include language and colony dummies, 
which take the value 1 if source and host share a common language and have had a colonial link, re-
spectively. We also control for the geographical distance between the capital cities of the source and 
host countries. All estimates of the other variables are in agreement with the existing literature, as we 
find that if investing and host countries share a common language and have had a colonial link, host 
countries tend to receive higher FDI flows. Finally, if the source and host countries are further away 
from each other, there are lower levels of FDI flows. Finally, column 5 introduces year and country-
pair fixed effects (where we drop the dummy variables as these variables are captured by the country-
pair fixed effect and do not vary over time). Similarly to the previous cases, we find that countries that 
have a relatively larger market size invest more and also receive more investment. The relationship 
between the level of democracy in the host country and FDI flows is positive and significant at the 
1% level. Furthermore, the coefficient on the democracy level of neighboring countries is positive and 
significant at the 5% level.
Overall, results from columns 1–5 control for the year, source, and country-pair fixed effects, and 
suggest that the OECD countries invest relatively more in countries that are democratic and also if 
host countries are surrounded by other democratic countries. Regarding the other variables that we 
controlled for, coefficient estimates have the expected signs. The results for all specifications confirm 
that the democracy level of neighboring countries positively affects FDI flows. In particular, a one 
standard deviation increase in the democracy level of neighboring countries (i.e., 5.585) leads to a 
7.54% increase in FDI flows to host countries (based on the coefficient of the democracy level of 
neighboring countries in column 5). For a country that receives average FDI flows of $461 million, 
a one standard deviation increase in the democracy level of neighboring countries leads to a $43.75 
million increase in FDI flows.
5.2 | Estimation results: Controlling for other neighboring country 
characteristics
It is possible that the association between institutional quality in neighboring countries and FDI flows to 
host countries might be due to omitted variables relating to neighboring country characteristics. Table 2 
presents the results when we control for other neighboring country characteristics such as civil conflict in 
the host and civil conflict in the neighboring country, market size of the neighboring countries (measured 
by the average GDP levels of neighboring countries), and the market potential of the host country when 
we include the year and country-pair fixed effects as in the specification used in column 5 of Table 1. In all 
these specifications, besides the additional neighboring country characteristics, we include the lagged FDI 
flows to examine the dynamic aspect of FDI flows, democracy in the host and neighboring countries, and 
the market size of the source and host countries. In column 1 of Table 2 we first control for civil conflict 
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in the host country and its neighboring countries. Both coefficients on civil conflict in the host country and 
its neighboring countries enter the regressions with the expected negative sign and both are statistically 
significant. In column 2 of Table 2 we control for the average market size of the neighboring countries, 
and we find that an increase in the average market size of neighbors leads to a rise in the FDI flows to 
the host country. In column 3 we also control for the market potential of the host country as neighboring 
countries might not directly be relatively rich themselves, but the host country may still be close enough 
to richer countries. We find that countries with higher market potential (i.e. countries that are close to 
high-income countries) also receive relatively higher FDI flows. Finally, in column 4 we control for all 
these neighboring characteristics. When we control for all factors, we find that all of the neighboring char-
acteristics enter the regressions with the expected signs. Civil conflict in the host country and neighboring 
countries depresses FDI flows to host countries. If the host country is surrounded by relatively larger 
markets and also has higher market potential, it also tends to receive higher FDI flows. Finally, even after 
controlling for additional neighboring country characteristics, the coefficient on the democracy level of 
neighboring countries is still significant at the 10% level.
In Table 2 we controlled for the year and country-pair fixed effects. However, some studies analyze 
how FDI might affect the institutional quality of the host country (e.g. Demir, 2016) while others in-
vestigate the importance of the institutional setting in attracting FDI (e.g. Alfaro et al., 2008) resulting 
in endogeneity. To address this issue, we use the system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and 
Bond (1998).
Table 3 controls for the neighboring country characteristics with the system GMM estimator, where 
both institutional quality proxies and conflict in the host and neighboring countries are considered as 
endogenous variables.5 In our regressions, we utilized 3–5 lags of endogenous variables as instrumen-
tal variables.6 In all cases, the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions suggests that we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of instrument validity. Even after accounting for the potential endogeneity, our 
main finding remains the same, with democratic countries and countries that are surrounded by rela-
tively better democracies receiving relatively higher FDI flows. Compared to Table 2, once we control 
for potential endogeneity, we find that the coefficients on civil conflict in neighboring countries and 
the average market size of the neighboring countries still have the expected signs, but they now be-
come insignificant.7 Countries with higher market potential still receive relatively higher FDI flows, 
but the coefficient drops from 1.154 to 0.466 (see column 4 of Tables 2 and 3, respectively). The co-
efficient of democracy of neighboring countries with the system GMM estimator is nearly three times 
as large as in the corresponding country-pair fixed effects estimation (0.0390 versus 0.0131 from 
column 4 of Tables 2 and 3, respectively). The coefficient on the democracy level of the host is also 
positive and significant at the 5% level when we control for all neighboring country characteristics. 
Furthermore, coefficients on the remaining control variables (i.e. lagged FDI flows, the market size of 
the source and host countries) are positive and significant at the 1% level.
Our findings suggest that a unit increase in democracy score in the host and neighboring countries 
would lead to a rise in FDI flows to host countries of roughly 3.5% and 4%, respectively. A one stan-
dard deviation increase in the democracy level of neighboring countries (i.e. 5.585) leads to a 24.33% 
increase in FDI flows to host countries (based on the coefficient of the democracy level of neighboring 
countries in column 4 of Table 3). For a country that receives average FDI flows of $461 million, a one 
standard deviation increase in the democracy level of neighboring countries leads to a $112.16 million 
increase in FDI flows. On the other hand, the estimated coefficient of lagged FDI flows is 0.819 in 
column 4 where we control for all neighboring country characteristics, which would suggest that the 
long-run effect of a unit increase in the democracy level of neighboring countries is roughly 24%.8
Overall, our main finding (i.e. the quality of institutions in neighboring countries is positively 
associated with FDI flows) is robust after accounting for various fixed effects (results obtained with 
12 |   PINAR ANd STENGOS
the gravity model), other neighboring country characteristics such as the market size and potential 
and conflict in neighboring countries, and even after tackling potential endogeneity problem (results 
obtained with system GMM estimations).
5.3 | Results with the use of different samples
We carry out robustness checks of our findings when we use different samples to test whether our 
findings are driven by some particular set of countries, and the results are presented in Table 4. We 
use the same set of neighboring country characteristics in our analysis to compare our findings with 
the baseline finding, which is in column 4 of Table 3 using the full sample case.
In column 1 of Table 4 we exclude the islands from our analysis to examine whether the defini-
tion of closest neighbor for island countries affect our results or not. We find that the effect of the 
democracy level in neighboring countries increases when compared to the baseline sample. This is 
something that was expected as the effect of contagious countries on each other would be larger when 
compared to islands that are relatively secluded from each other.
In column 2 we exclude the European Union countries from the list to examine whether our results 
might be driven by the membership of the EU, since entry and membership of the EU require conver-
gence in democratic institutions through EU legislation as well as economic convergence through the 
T A B L E  3  Controlling for other neighboring characteristics with system GMM
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(FDI flows)i,j,t – 1 0.820*** (0.00671) 0.820*** (0.00671) 0.819*** (0.00680) 0.819*** (0.00678)
Democracyj,t – 1 0.0361** (0.0173) 0.0365** (0.0175) 0.0342** (0.0172) 0.0342** (0.0174)
N_Democracyj,t – 1 0.0325** (0.0166) 0.0343** (0.0165) 0.0370** (0.0182) 0.0390** (0.0193)
ln(GDP)i,t – 1 0.392*** (0.0202) 0.391*** (0.0202) 0.401*** (0.0206) 0.400*** (0.0206)
ln(GDP)j,t – 1 0.369*** (0.0212) 0.365*** (0.0218) 0.382*** (0.0206) 0.377*** (0.0213)
Conflictj,t – 1 −0.0240 (0.0430) −0.0205 (0.0436) −0.0191 (0.0433) −0.0152 (0.0440)
N_Conflictj,t – 1 −0.0148 (0.0151) −0.0148 (0.0152) −0.0143 (0.0152) −0.0141 (0.0153)
ln(N_GDP)j,t – 1 0.0107 (0.0164) 0.00838 (0.0165)
ln(Market 
potential)j,t – 1
0.452*** (0.112) 0.466*** (0.119)
Observations 28,272 28,007 28,272 28,007
Number of pairs 3,905 3,874 3,905 3,874
AR(3) (p-value)a .984 .993 .984 .994
Overidentification 
test (p-value)b 
.097 .110 .103 .119
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the foreign direct investment flows from source country i to host country 
j at time t. Democracy and N_Democracy are the institutional quality proxies for the host country and neighboring countries of the 
host country, respectively. Conflict and N_Conflict are the conflict levels in the host and neighboring countries of the host country, 
respectively. N_GDP represents the average GDP of the neighboring countries of host country. All estimations utilize the system 
GMM estimation technique and use 3–5 lags for the endogenous variables. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
aArellano–Bond test that the third-order autocorrelation in residuals is 0. First- second-order autocorrelations are not reported as they 
are rejected at the 10% significance level. 
bHansen J-test for overidentification of restrictions in GMM estimation. 
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European Structural and Investment Funds.9 When the EU countries are excluded from our sample, 
the coefficients of the democracy level of the host countries and neighboring countries are still posi-
tive and statistically significant at the 5% level. In column 3 we exclude the subgroup of EU countries 
from our sample which are also part of the euro zone. In that case, the democracy levels in the host 
and neighboring countries remain positive and significant at the 5% level. In column 4 we exclude the 
OECD countries from the host country group, and the results of our main variable of interest (neigh-
boring democratic institutions) remain significant.
In column 5 we exclude the countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) from our analysis since the 
neighboring country characteristics have been found to be important for this region (Easterly & 
Levine, 2000). Furthermore, factors that attract FDI to this region are found to be different compared 
to other developing countries (Asiedu, 2002), and improvements in institutional quality in this region 
have fallen behind other developing regions (Asiedu, 2004), even though market access to this region 
has had a positive effect in recent years (Bosker & Garretsen, 2012). The positive effect of neighbor-
ing institutional quality on FDI flows to host countries remains significant after excluding the SSA 
countries from our analysis.
We exclude the high-income countries from our analysis in column 6.10 Similarly to the EU case, 
institutional quality in both host and neighboring countries remains a significant factor, with relatively 
higher coefficients estimates compared to the baseline ones.
Finally, irrespective of the sample used, coefficients on the lagged FDI, the market size of the 
source and host country, and host country market potential remain positive and significant at the 1% 
level.
5.4 | Controlling for additional host country characteristics
We also control for some other characteristics of the host country since they could be correlated with 
neighbor country characteristics, and their omission could lead to omitted variable bias. For instance, 
to be part of the EU, countries need to follow the Copenhagen criteria that require ‘stable condi-
tions guaranteeing democracy [and] the rule of law’. This enables countries to trade freely, hence 
increasing trade, financial integration, and infrastructure integration through the European Structural 
and Investment Funds Regulations. In other words, the initial conditions to be part of the EU (i.e. 
institutional, political, and economic requirements) provided a way to promote trade, financial, and 
structural integration. To control whether the diffusion of institutional quality (i.e. institutional qual-
ity levels in the neighboring countries) does not have an effect on FDI flows through these factors, 
we control for capital account openness, trade openness, and infrastructure levels in the host country. 
Furthermore, Asiedu and Lien (2011) find that democracy promotes higher FDI flows if and only 
if a host country has a natural resource rent that is less than a given threshold, and as such, we also 
control for oil rents of the host country. Table 5 presents the results when we control for capital open-
ness (measured as the updated capital account openness measure of Chinn & Ito, 2006, 2008), trade 
openness (measured as the total value of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP), infrastructure 
(measured as the number of telephone lines per 100 people) and oil rents (measured as the value of 
oil rents as a percentage of GDP) of the host country, which are obtained from World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank, respectively. Columns 1–4 report the results when we include capital 
account openness, trade openness, infrastructure level, and oil rents of the host country in the analysis 
one at a time, respectively. We find that countries that trade more and with better infrastructure also 
receive relatively higher FDI flows. Finally, column 5 of Table 5 controls for all these factors; now 
capital openness becomes negative and significant. More importantly, after accounting for additional 
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host country characteristics, the effects of host country and neighboring countries’ institutional set-
tings on FDI flows remain significant.
5.5 | Controlling for alternative institutional quality measures
We have chosen the democracy measure as our main institutional quality measure as it captures various 
aspects of the institutional setting (see Section 3 for discussion). To control whether our results are robust 
to additional measures of institutional quality, we further control for, on the one hand, the rule of law 
and, on the other hand, political stability and absence-of-violence measures from the World Governance 
Indicators. The former is one of the most common measures used to assess institutional quality, whereas 
the latter can be considered as an additional control for political stability. Similarly to the previous cases, 
we use the institutional quality measures (democracy and the rule of law) and civil conflict measures 
as endogenous variables in our estimations. Table 6 summarizes the results when we include the rule 
of law in the host country and the rule of law in the neighboring countries in our analysis. We find that 
the rule of law in the host country does matter for FDI flows as countries with better-functioning legal 
systems attract relatively higher FDI flows, yet the effect of the rule of law in the neighboring countries 
is negative and statistically insignificant. We repeat our analysis by including political stability and the 
absence-of-violence proxy. Our findings for the political stability proxy are similar to those for the rule 
of law, where higher levels of political stability in the host country attract higher capital flows, yet the 
political stability proxy in neighboring countries is not significant. The remaining factors are in line with 
the findings of the previous tables. Moreover, most importantly, the democracy level in both the host 
country and neighboring countries positively and significantly affects the levels of FDI flows.
5.6 | Results with the use of alternative democracy proxy
We used the democracy index from the Polity IV project as our proxy to measure the quality of demo-
cratic institutions of the host and the neighboring countries of the host country. To control whether our 
results are robust to an alternative proxy of democratic institutions, we use the Varieties of Democracy 
(V-DEM) indicator of political corruption index. The index is arrived at by taking the average of the 
public sector corruption index, the executive corruption index, the indicator for legislative corruption 
and the indicator for judicial corruption (for details, see Coppedge et al., 2020; Pemstein et al., 2020), 
which could be considered as a measure of political accountability (for examinations of the impact of 
democratic accountability on FDI flows, see Kolstad & Villanger, 2008; Doytch & Eren, 2012; Bailey, 
2018). The political corruption index ranges between 0 and 1, and higher values represent a higher pres-
ence of corruption in executive, legislative, and judicial levels. To be consistent with the democracy 
index of Polity IV, we reverse the measure so that higher values represent lower political corruption.
Table 7 presents the results when we re-estimate the equations of Tables 2 and 3 with the use of 
the political corruption variable as a proxy for democratic accountability instead of the democracy 
index from Polity IV. The results reported in columns 1–4 and 5–8 of Table 7 are obtained with the 
gravity and system GMM models, respectively. With either estimation method, we find that political 
corruption in the host and the neighboring countries is a significant determinant of the FDI flows to 
the host country. Furthermore, in all cases, the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions suggests 
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity. Overall, we find that the quality of the 
democratic institutions in the neighboring countries of the host country is a significant determinant 
of the FDI flows to the host country even after using an alternative proxy for democratic institutions.
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5.7 | Possible indirect channels of neighboring institutional quality
We have examined how institutional quality in neighboring countries directly affects FDI flows to 
host countries. We now examine briefly how neighboring institutional quality might also affect other 
factors in the host country that are also found to be important in attracting FDI flows to these countries.
Table 8 suggests some possible ways in which institutional quality in neighboring countries (i.e. 
two proxies of democracy, the rule of law, and political stability in the neighboring countries) might 
influence some other characteristics of the host country. This table presents regression results that 
summarize the association between host country characteristics and the institutional quality of the 
neighboring countries after controlling for year effects.
The significant associations between neighboring institutions and the characteristics of the host 
country are in line with the existing literature. We find that countries that are surrounded by other 
countries with good institutions will also have a good institutional setting (see, for example, Kelejian 
et al., 2013, who show that the rule of law in neighboring countries has a direct effect on the rule 
of law of the home country after accounting for a variety of control variables). Even though the rule of 
law and political stability in neighboring countries are not significant in our results, improvements of 
these in neighboring countries can affect the rule of law and political stability in the host countries, 
something that, in turn, was found to be important in attracting higher FDI flows. In other words, 
better rule of law and higher political stability in neighboring countries leads to higher capital flows 
to host countries via their effect on the host country’s institutional setting. Similarly, countries that 
are surrounded by better democracies tend to be more democratic themselves, suggesting that the 
democratic neighbors have not only a direct but also an indirect effect on FDI flows to host countries. 
Moreover, being surrounded by countries with good institutions leads not only to higher institutional 
quality for a given host country but also to higher levels of economic development—see, for exam-
ple, seminal papers by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) and Rodrik et al. (2004) which 
show that institutional quality is one of the main determinants of long-term economic development. 
Furthermore, these countries achieve higher development levels since there is a significant correlation 
between market size (i.e. GDP) and standard of living (i.e. GDP per capita) with neighboring institu-
tions (see, for example, Bosker & Garretsen, 2009, who found that the neighboring institutions have 
a direct effect on economic development of countries). Furthermore, countries that are surrounded by 
good institutions experience lower civil conflict and have higher political stability.
Overall, Table  8 summarizes some channels by which the institutional quality of neighboring 
countries and as well the institutional quality of the host country might play a role in attracting higher 
levels of FDI. In our analysis, we provided the direct link that democratic institutions of the neigh-
boring countries do indeed matter for the FDI flows to host countries, yet these channels need to be 
further explored to disentangle how and why institutions matter for attracting capital.
6 |  CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this paper we examine whether democratic institutions in neighboring countries matter for FDI 
flows to host countries. We find that investing countries not only look at the democratic institutions 
of the host country but also evaluate the democratic institutions in neighboring countries when they 
decide to invest. In particular, we find that countries that are democratic and surrounded by other 
democratic countries receive relatively higher FDI flows. Our results were robust to the choice of 
different estimation techniques (gravity model and system GMM), different samples, and another set 
of neighboring country characteristics such as the conflict in neighboring countries, market size of 
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the neighboring countries, and market potential of the host country. We also controlled for alternative 
measures of institutional quality settings and used an alternative proxy for democratic institutions, 
and we find that democratic institutions in neighboring countries still matter for FDI flows to host 
countries. Furthermore, in some specifications, we find that civil conflict in neighboring countries 
also leads to lower levels of FDI flows to host countries, and countries that are close to relatively 
larger markets also receive more FDI flows. In all specifications, we also find that host countries that 
have higher market potential (i.e. if a host country is relatively closer to high-income countries) also 
receive relatively higher FDI flows. Furthermore, we briefly investigated potential indirect links of 
neighboring country institutional settings with other factors in the host country. For instance, we find 
that countries that are surrounded by neighbors that have better institutions tend to have a better in-
stitutional setting themselves. In other words, improvements in neighboring institutions also increase 
the FDI flows to host countries through their effect on a better institutional setting of the host country. 
Considering both the direct and indirect effects of the democracy level of neighboring countries, its 
impact on FDI flows is significant in both the short and long term.
Our study provides empirical support for the importance of neighboring country characteristics on 
the FDI location choice. Even though the institutional theory is one of the most utilized frameworks in 
this research, its use in empirical work is relatively small (see, for example, Blonigen & Piger, 2014; 
Nielsen et al., 2017). In this paper our empirical findings show that it is not only the institutional 
setting of the host countries that matters for the location choice of the FDI but also the institutional 
setting of the neighboring countries. Therefore, future studies should incorporate neighboring country 
characteristics into their analysis.
Our results suggest that if neighboring countries act together to improve their institutional quality, 
FDI flows to these countries will be much higher since not only does improving their institutional 
quality attracts more FDI inflows but also being surrounded by neighboring countries that have better 
institutional quality will also lead to higher FDI flows. In other words, regions that are clustered with 
relatively low institutional quality (or with lower democratic institutions) can attract higher levels of 
FDI flows by acting together and improving their institutional settings.
We should note that we analyzed FDI flows from the OECD countries to an extensive list of host 
countries. We found that the OECD countries give importance to the institutional quality setting of the 
host country and also whether countries are surrounded by other countries with good institutions when 
investing. However, investments made by emerging and developing countries have become important 
in recent years. For instance, it has been found that emerging economies have a better willingness to 
operate in countries that have relatively poor institutions (see, for example, Aleksynska & Havrylchyk, 
2013). For example, Chinese outward investments go to countries that have relatively poor institutions 
(see, for example, Kolstad & Wiig, 2012). Hence, even though a better institutional setting in neigh-
boring countries matters for the OECD countries, it might not do so in the case of emerging economies 
investing in other countries. As a result, countries that are surrounded by countries with relatively poor 
institutions might receive relatively lower FDI flows from the OECD countries, but might receive 
relatively higher investment from emerging markets. This can then lead to divergence in the evolution 
of institutional settings, depending on the origins of the FDI flows. This is potentially a new research 
area, which needs to be investigated in the future.
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ENDNOTES
 1 Note that we discuss only some of the papers that analyze the importance of democracy, political risk, and institu-
tional setting in the host countries, among many other factors that are found to be important, such as the financial 
openness of a country, institutional distance between source and host country, trade openness, tax levels, and differ-
ences in wage levels in two countries—see Blonigen and Piger (2014) and Nielsen, Asmussen, and Weatherall (2017) 
for a review of literature on determinants of FDI. 
 2 The detailed bilateral FDI flows from OECD countries to partner countries can be obtained from https://stats.oecd.
org/index.aspx?DataS etCod e=FDI_FLOW_PARTNER. 
 3 For instance, Estonia and Slovenia gained their independence in 1991 and both the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
became independent nations in 1993 after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. 
 4 When a country is an island, we consider the closest country in terms of distance between capital cities of countries. 
Note that we also repeated our analysis by excluding islands from the sample, and the results are presented in Section 
5. 
 5 The choice of endogenous variables is in line the recent literature analyzing similar relationships. For instance, 
Asiedu and Lien (2011) use a similar estimation technique considering democracy as an endogenous variable, 
whereas, Qureshi (2013) considers conflict in the host and neighboring countries as endogenous variables. 
 6 The first two orders of autocorrelation are rejected at the 10% significance level. However, in all cases, the Arellano–
Bond test that the third-order autocorrelation in residuals is 0 is not rejected and we used third or higher lags as 
instrumental variables. 
 7 We also included the average GDP per capita levels of neighboring countries in our regressions and found that the co-
efficient on average GDP per capita of neighboring countries is not significant after controlling for other neighboring 
country characteristics. 
 8 Note that the coefficient estimates are obtained with log-level regressions and the estimated percentage change is 
calculated as 100 (e0.0390∕(1−0.819) −1). 
 9 We exclude the EU countries from the year that they became a member. We also redo our analysis by only excluding 
those countries from the sample which were members during the whole period and the results are similar to those 
reported here; these results are available upon request from the authors. 
 10 We use the World Bank classification to exclude the high-income countries from the analysis. 
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APPENDIX A
T A B L E  A 1  Countries used in the analysis
Afghanistan Estonia* Lebanon Saudi Arabia
Albania Ethiopia Liberia Senegal
Algeria Finland* Libya Sierra Leone
Angola France* Lithuania Singapore
Argentina Gabon Luxembourg* Slovakia*
Armenia Gambia Madagascar Slovenia*
Australia* Georgia Malawi Somalia
Austria* Germany* Malaysia South Africa
Azerbaijan Ghana Mali Spain*
Bangladesh Greece* Mexico* Sri Lanka
Belarus Guatemala Moldova Sudan
Belgium* Guinea Mongolia Swaziland
Bolivia Guinea-Bissau Morocco Sweden*
Botswana Guyana Mozambique Switzerland*
Brazil Haiti Myanmar Syria
Bulgaria Honduras Namibia Tajikistan
Burkina Faso Hungary* Nepal Tanzania
Cameroon Iceland* Netherlands* Thailand
Canada* India New Zealand* Togo
Central Afr. Rep. Indonesia Nicaragua Trinidad & 
Tobago
Chad Iran Niger Tunisia
Chile* Iraq Nigeria Turkey*
China Ireland* Norway* Turkmenistan
Colombia Israel* Oman Uganda
Congo, Dem. Rep. Italy* Pakistan Ukraine
Congo, Rep. Jamaica Panama United Arab 
Emirates
Costa Rica Japan* Papua New Guinea United 
Kingdom*
Côte d'Ivoire Jordan Paraguay United States*
Croatia Kazakhstan Peru Uruguay
Cyprus Kenya Philippines Uzbekistan
Czech Rep.* Korea, Dem. Rep. Poland* Venezuela
Denmark* Korea, Rep.* Portugal* Vietnam
Dominican Rep. Kuwait Qatar Yemen
Ecuador Kyrgyzstan Romania Zambia
Egypt Laos Russia Zimbabwe
El Salvador Latvia Rwanda
Notes: Countries with * are the OECD countries.
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T A B L E  A 2  Variables, definitions and sources
Variable Definition Source
Aggregate FDI inflows Aggregate FDI inflows (measured in U.S. 
dollars)
World Bank – World 
development Indicators (WDI)
FDI inflows Bilateral FDI flows from OECD countries to 
host countries (measured in U.S. dollars)
OECD. Available via: https://data.
oecd.org/
GDP Gross Domestic Product (in constant 2010 
U.S. dollars)
World Bank – WDI
GDP per capita GDP divided by the population World Bank – WDI
Population Country’s total population World Bank – WDI
Land area Country's total area (measured in km square) World Bank – WDI
Language Dummy variable indicating if a language is 
spoken by at least 9% of the population in 
source and host countries
Mayer and Zignago (2011)
Colony Dummy variable indicating whether source 
and host countries have ever had a colonial 
link
Mayer and Zignago (2011)
Distance Distance between most important cities/
agglomerations between source and host 
countries
Mayer and Zignago (2011)
Regional trade agreements Dummy variable indicating whether a source 
and host country has a regional trade 
agreement in a given period or not.
World Trade Organisation. 
Available via: https://rtais.
wto.org/UI/Publi cMain tainR 
TAHome.aspx
Democracy Polity 2 measure ranges between −10 
and + 10, which suggests full autocracy and 
democracy, respectively.
Polity IV Project, Political 
Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800–2015, 
Available via: http://www.syste 
micpe ace.org/inscr data.html
Rule of law Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent 
to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence, which 
ranges between −2.5 and + 2.5, where higher 
score represents better rule of law.
Rule of law component of the 
World Governance Indicators 
(Kaufmann et al. 2013) 
Available via: http://info.world 
bank.org/gover nance/ wgi/#home
Political stability and 
Absence of Violence
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/
Terrorism measures perceptions of the 
likelihood of political instability and/or 
politically motivated violence, including 
terrorism. This measure ranges between −2.5 
and + 2.5, where higher score represents 
higher political stability.
Political stability and absence 
of violence component of the 
World Governance Indicators 
(Kaufmann et al. 2013) 
Available via: http://info.world 
bank.org/gover nance/ wgi/#home
(Continues)
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Variable Definition Source
Conflict Magnitude score of episode(s) of civil 
violence and warfare, ethnic violence and 
warfare involving that state in that year.
Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) 
Major Episodes of Political 
Violence, 1946–2015, URL: 
www.syste micpe ace.org/warli 
st.htm
Conflict in neighboring 
countries
Sum of all societal (civil and ethnic) MEPV 
magnitude scores for all neighboring 
countries
Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) 
Major Episodes of Political 
Violence, 1946–2015, URL: 
www.syste micpe ace.org/warli 
st.htm
Capital account openness A measure of capital account liberalization 
where the index ranges between 0 and 1, 
where higher score represents more open 
capital account. This index is based on IMF's 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions.
Chinn and Ito (2006, 2008). 
Updated data available via: 
http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn 
-Ito_websi te.htm
Trade openness Total imports and exports of goods divided by 
GDP, in %
World Bank – WDI
Phone Fixed telephone subscriptions (per 100 
people)
World Bank – WDI
Oil rents/GDP Oil rents divided by GDP, in % World Bank – WDI
T A B L E  A 2  (Contined)
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T A B L E  A 3  Summary statistics
Variable Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Obs
ln (FDI flows) 9.46 8.91 0 25.87 38,891
Democracy in host country 4.38 6.27 −10 10 38,198
Democracy in neighbouring countries 3.83 5.44 −10 10 38,599
Rule of law in host country −0.01 1.07 −2.67 2.00 36,366
Rule of law in neighbouring countries −0.11 0.89 −1.91 1.98 36,366
Political stability of law in host country −0.15 1.01 −3.32 1.66 36,366
Political stability in neighbouring countries −0.22 0.77 −2.13 1.69 36,366
ln(Source country GDP) 26.80 1.57 22.76 30.37 38,891
ln(Host country GDP) 25.12 2.05 19.30 30.37 38,094
ln (Source country population) 16.48 1.55 12.48 19.57 38,891
ln (Host country population) 16.51 1.51 12.48 21.02 38,888
ln (Source land area) 12.05 1.58 7.86 16.03 38,891
ln (Host land area) 12.45 1.79 6.51 16.61 38,891
Common language dummy variable 0.09 0.29 0 1 38,891
Colony dummy variable 0.04 0.20 0 1 38,891
ln (Distance) 8.42 0.99 2.95 9.88 38,891
RTA dummy variable 0.29 0.46 0 1 38,891
Civil conflict in host country 0.51 1.41 0 10 38,599
Civil conflict in neighbouring countries 2.18 3.77 0 29 38,599
ln (Average GDP of neighbouring countries) 25.90 1.78 19.97 30.37 38,526
ln (Market Potential) 17.52 0.25 16.63 17.93 38,891
